This working paper examines the remarkable growth of wine consumption in the United States since the 1960s. The country is now the largest wine consumer in the world, exceeding the wine-producing European countries such as France and Italy, which had long dominated world markets. The paper identifies the late 1960s and 1970s as the major turning point by analyzing the role of businesses in reinventing the image of wine from a cheap and very alcoholic beverage to a sophisticated natural product, and a fine accompaniment for gourmet food. By creating wine as a symbol of social status, the reimagined wine industry became a reinforcer of social and class divisions in the United States.
"an acquired disposition" to "establish and mark difference by a process of distinction," I argue that taste for wine functioned as "a system of differentiation," reproducing social inequality and 4 Elie Skofis, "Production of Table Wines in naturalizing the ideology of taste. 6 By examining how and why the late-1960s became a key moment for the American wine industry, this paper illuminates the process of taste making, the embodiment of one's taste, and the negotiation of taste and power relations. In doing so, the paper suggests that the construction of American wine culture entailed what Howard Becker called "cooperative links" between different activities, conducted by various actors including wine companies, grape farmers, advertisers, newspaper and magazine journalists, and consumers. 7 This creation of tastes for wine and its images helped change wine consumption patterns and expanded the market.
This working paper seeks to broaden the scope of the current business history literature on the wine industry. Business historians have explored the rise of the wine industry across countries by analyzing wineries' production and marketing strategies, institutional structures, and commodity chains. 8 More recently, scholars from various disciplines have expanded their studies to integrate regulatory policies on wine businesses, consumption patterns, and cultural changes. In Empire of Vines, for example, Erica Hannickel contends that horticultural literature, as well as wineries, created a bucolic image that obscured imperial ambitions, environmental degradation, and economic and racial exploitation in the American wine industry. 9 Building on
Hannickel's approach, this working paper brings perspectives of cultural and social history to business history to analyze how corporate marketing helped create and altered consumers' attitude towards drinking.
The 1960s and 1970s were decades of conflict in the United States, associated with the Civil Rights movement, the rise of the second wave of feminism, and the protracted dispute over American involvement in Vietnam War. In historicizing the creation of wine as a modern cultural artifact, this paper positions the wine industry at this moment of transition and conflict, and shows how wine emerged as a new form of social differentiation.
The Definition of Wine
American wine-making and -drinking are not modern developments. While Native Table ("table wine indicates strong associations between a certain type of wine and sophisticated taste by calling the change of taste from "liquorous," or dessert, wines to dry table wines as the "development" of taste. Although Schoonmaker and Adams did not necessarily regarded imported wines as better than American wines, they, too, believed that taste for table wines was a proof of civilization and their mission was to educate American consumers.
The distinction between "table" and "dessert" wines and the notion of dry wine as sophisticated taste exemplify the construction of a wine discourse and its pervasiveness in American society. In their co-edited book French Food (2001), Lawrence Schehr and Allen
Weiss asserted that "the words and texts of an expansive culinary discourse" "fixed the culinary product and gave it an existence beyond the sphere of immediate culinary production" by transforming "the material into the intellectual, the imaginative, the symbolic, and the aesthetic." 29 As wine connoisseurs, the wine industry, and journalists created and disseminated a discourse about wine -fermented grape juice came to symbolize "something chic and sophisticated." Wine companies' catechism needed to have an immediate effect, that is, to lead consumers to purchase their products, rather than to train lifetime connoisseurs. Their advertisements thus told consumers explicitly to look for their labels, suggesting that the taste of wine was less important than a brand name to develop a taste for wine (Figure 3) . In a newly developing market, it was indispensable for wine companies to offer specific information about their brands to "novice" consumers who had just started drinking wine.
Knowledge did not obliterate class and racial differences, however. To the contrary, there was an imbalance in its dissemination, and in turn wine literacy widened fissures among people of different social and economic status. Several market studies reported that primary wine Americans also featured some wine advertisements, but the number was far fewer than other magazines. 35 In reproducing the hierarchies of social relations, the exclusion of African
Americans and the working class from an informal education system in popular magazines reaffirms that taste for wine was a domain of white middle-class consumers, who possessed both economic and cultural capital to acquire taste in wine culture. he repeats the same comment, "dynamite wine," to describe different kinds of wines whose names sounded French. While trying to boast of his knowledge and taste, he does nothing but expose the superficiality of his knowledge. This satire as well as the market research on labeling underscores that the acquisition and the presentation of knowledge were ways to demonstrate one's taste. Consumers expressed their tastes not only through what they consumed but also through how they consumed.
The body and self-presentation also functioned as vehicles that exposed one's taste. 38 In the mid-1950s, a market study found that 90 percent of the American public still associated Almadén advertised the naturalness and sacredness of wine through an image of grapes.
One of its advertisements depicted a mythical image in which a God-like couple, or anthropomorphized nature, took care of grapes as their children (Figure 6 ). In reality, however, those who harvested and picked grapes were farm laborers many of whom were immigrants. In a Christian Brothers' advertisement, images of workers showed involvement of human labor in grape growing (Figure 7 ). But these laborers from nineteenth-century engravings sentimentalized and idealized the actual work that actually took place on the Napa Valley fields.
Contrary to the image of wine as a product of "nature," the late-twentieth-century rise of Ulin argues, the concept of "natural" was used rhetorically and hegemonically to support the privileged position occupied by some large growers, marketing firms, and global corporations.
The "hegemonic components of cultural representation" elucidates the power relations between workers and wine companies as well as between smaller wineries and large wine companies.
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The "Authenticity" of Wine Culture
While obscuring the inequality between different classes, the hierarchical relations between wineries and laborers, and the mechanization of wine production, many wine advertisements foregrounded the image of wine as civilized and natural. These advertisements served to legitimize wine culture and sophisticated taste. As consumers repeatedly came into contact with the representation of wine in their everyday lives, various media, including newspapers, magazines, and TV programs, created images of wine and wine-drinking culture as 44 Exclusive hotels also presented a pleasant and luxurious stay by using an image of wine, especially high quality wine cellars and professional sommeliers. The St. Regis-Sheraton advertised that its cellar "reflects his [a sommelier's] abiding interest and knowledgeability,"
and that its wines from "renowned vineyards of the worlds" were stored "in temperature controlled rooms, ready for service in the gilded restaurants." Such "attention to detail" was "characteristic of this well-mannered hotel." Ritz-Carlton also emphasized high-quality wine as one of its service.
Advertisements for Grey Poupon Dijon mustard and for Parker's soft-tip pen employed a metaphor of aging (Figures 9 and 10) . In contrast to the ephemerality and a rapid-pace life style in modern consumer society, aging symbolized maturity, patience, and the timeless quality. Grey
Poupon's mustard contained a small amount of white wine, but the signification of wine in this ad was more than a mere ingredient. Rather, the analogy between wine and mustard indicated excellence in its quality. The Parker solemnized its product by indicating the aging of wine and the age of a winery, Château Lafite-Rothschild, designated on a wine bottle in the ad. The
Château's wine was one of the most renowned and expensive wines in the world. 1868 on the label, supposed to be the wine's vintage, was the year when Baron James de Rothschild purchased Château Lafite. Its bottles have since then been labeled Lafite-Rothschild. The name of a prestigious Château and the year when it was renamed as such registered the Parker's refillable pen with first-class quality and long-lasting value. By adapting the value of wine culture as authentic, these companies from various industries presented their products also as authentic and high quality. 
Labor Struggles and Winemaking
The construction of the wine image as nostalgic, sacred, and natural was a volatile project and entailed a subversive hegemony. On March 2, 1975, an alarming image appeared in The New
York Times: blood shedding from a cluster of grapes. This full-page advertisement by the United Farm Workers (UFW) called for a boycott against Gallo wines (Figure 11) . 59 The advertisement's image showed a decade-long struggle and frustration of farm workers against large corporations. By this time, the American wine industry had been highly concentrated: the four largest wine companies, including Gallo, accounted for more than 50 percent of all wine consumption. 60 The UFW's boycott and its impact also illuminate a negotiating process in the making of taste and wine culture between wine companies, the union and farm workers, and middle-class consumers.
In 1965, the UFW, led by Cesar Chavez, struck against the grape growers of the Delano region in southern California and launched a boycott of grapes. 61 The union's target included wineries as well as Schenley Industries, whose various liquor brands and other products drew at least $250 million in annual sales in the year, and the DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation, which operated more than thirteen thousand acres of vineyards in California. 62 In the following year,
Chavez began a three-hundred-mile march, along with strikers and supporters, from Delano to the state capitol building in Sacramento. 63 In 1967, the UWF won contracts with the major grape growers such as the Christian Brothers, Almadén, Paul Masson, and Gallo, the four biggest wine companies in the country. In acknowledging farm workers' efforts to unionize themselves, The Wall Street Journal called these two years of improvement as "days of wine and roses." But "the days ahead could easily be fraught with headaches and thorns," commented the article. 64 In California, approximately a half of the total grape yielding was used for wine in the mid-1960s. 65 Thus for major wine companies, the UFW's grape strike posed a significant threat.
Naturally, it was mostly wineries that signed the contract with the UFW in 1967. But the contract covered only about 5,000 of the state's 250,000 farm workers. 66 While the 1967 contracts clearly had economic importance for wineries, the majority of farm workers were still struggling without a labor contract. Yet the UFW's achievement, especially the contract with Gallo, was important to the union not necessarily for the number of workers but for its symbolic value.
Ernest Gallo first admired Chavez and was sympathetic with a labor union, at least ostensibly. In his interview, Ernest proudly stated that Gallo was "one of the first to agree to have [their] vineyard unionized" and he was "in favor of this movement throughout California to organize the grape laborers." 67 As the UFW became more active especially against Gallo, however, Ernest began to consider Chavez's operation of the union as disorganized, inefficient, and unreliable. 68 At the contract renewal in the spring of 1973, the company entered into negotiations with the UFW's rival union, the International Brotherhood of Teamsters. 69 When
Gallo signed the contract with the Teamsters in 1973, the UFW began a second grape strike, in which two union members lost their lives at picket lines. While the company protested that they were the innocent victims of "a turf war" between rival unions, the media repeatedly publicized that Ernest and his brother Julio were the leaders of the crusade to defeat Chavez.
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In the midst of this struggle against Gallo, the UFW published the bloody grape ad in The New York Times and other newspapers. The article explained working conditions on a grape farm and protested the necessity and legitimacy of a boycott for the justice of laborers: "We're fighting our lives. Because we need our union to survive. And we think the Gallos and the other grape growers are guilty of union-busting." "Is this America?" the union repeatedly asked readers. "There's blood on those grapes!" This blood was far from an image of sacred wine, that is, the blood of Christ. It was a symbol of struggle against the tyranny of wine companies, indicating the deaths of two workers during the 1973 strike.
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By showing an image of grapes rather than a bottle of wine to call for a boycott of Gallo wines, this UFW's advertisement suggests the labor relations in the wine industry. Grapes were crucial ingredients for wine production. The specific origin and variety of grapes determined not only the quality of wine but also its designation on the label. Under federal law, for instance, a varietal names such as chardonnay needed to include more than 75 percent of the variety. In California, to designate wine as "California central coast counties dry wine," producers were required to use only grapes grown within the fifteen counties specified in the law including Sonoma and Napa. Since wine companies could not use grapes from other regions for a certain wine, a grape strike had a direct impact on wine companies in California. As The Wall Street Journal observed, the "boycott and its threat became a potent weapon." 72 This did not necessarily mean that grape laborers had stronger power against their employers than other farm
workers. Yet, an image of grapes and blood printed on the newspaper was a signifier not simply of wine but also of the hierarchical relations between growers and laborers. The grape image disclosed the contradictions of material affluence, industrial development, and labor exploitation.
While Gallo insisted publicly that the boycott had no major effect on the company, its national sales dropped by 7 percent in 1974. 73 The impact of the boycott was not only on Gallo Nestle, started to invest in California wine. These large companies introduced to vineyards business strategies that focused on brands, marketing campaigns, and stable and high returns.
They increasingly marketed wine as a brand product, which served as a marker for consumers to judge the quality of wine. 83 With financial investment, intensive marketing, and technological advancement, winemaking became a huge enterprise by the late 1970s. Wine companies' marketing strategies that promoted certain brands and employed easy-to-understand labels and wine names not only expanded the domestic wine market but also recreated the image of wine and wine-drinking culture.
Conclusion
The 
